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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
DAVID ALLEN LONG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
Supreme Court No. 38580 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon 
HONORABLE THOMAS J. RYAN, District Judge 
Appellant Attorney of Record: 
Michael Jacques 
JACQUES LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
2021 Cleveland Blvd. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone (208) 344-2224 
Facsimile (208) 287-4300 
Respondent Attorney of Record: 
Lawrence G. Wadsen 
Office of Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile (208) 854-8071 
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ISSL'ES ADDRESSED IN RESPONSE TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
I. IF ASSESSED USING THE USUAL INFERENCES THAT REASONABLE MEN 
DRAW FROM EVIDENCE, WERE THE FACTS OFFERED TO SUPPORT 
CONSISTENCY WITH THE OFFICER'S TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE 
PERTAINING TO LONG'S RESIDENCE ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE 
PROPOSITION THAT LONG DID NOT RESIDE AT 11576 CRESTED BUTTE? 
II. DO THE FACTS VIEWED UNDER TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
TEST JUSTIFY THE CHIEF EVIL AGAINST WHICH THE WORDING OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT IS DIRECTED? 
1 
ARGUMENT 
In an attempt to not be excessively repetitive, this response will be restricted to two (2) 
rebuttals. First, Respondent (hereinafter "the State") spends considerable time trying to reinforce 
the proposition that facts were offered consistent with ISP eagle's training and experience. 
Appellant (hereinafter "Long") will address only one (1) of the two (2) assertions, namely that 
the evidence discovered regarding where Long resided was consistent with ISP Cagle's training 
and experience. Second, this response will address the State's assertion that Long's approach to 
analyzing the facts offered is inappropriate and should be analyzed under the totality of 
circumstances. 
I. IF ASSESSED USI~G THE USUAL INFERENCES THAT REASONABLE MEN 
DRAW FROM EVIDENCE, THE FACTS OFFERED TO SUPPORT CONSISTENCY 
WITH THE OFFICER'S TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE PERTAINING TO LONG'S 
RESIDENCE DO NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION THAT LONG DID NOT 
RESIDE AT 11576 CRESTED BUTTE. 
The State spends considerable time attempting to bolster the claim that Detective Cagle's 
findings in regards to Long's place ofresidence were consistent with his training and experience 
which informed that "it's not always common that people live in the residence where they grow 
their marijuana." Tr Vol. I, p. 11, L. 13-14. However, the State inaccurately recites a pertinent 
fact to this argument and seems to ignore facts that strongly suggest otherwise. 
The State alleges that on July 1, 2010 that Long "arrived at 11576 Crested Butte while 
the house was under surveillance." Brief of Respondent, p. 8, L. 2-3. This is factually 
inaccurate. A review of the citation the State referenced informs clearly that Detective Cagle 
stated, "I believe it was the 1st of July, I directed a surveillance of that residence. While we were 
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set up on the residence, observed [sic] a red Toyota pickup pull out of the garage of the residence 
driven by Mr. Long." Tr Vol. I, p. 12, L. 21-24. Surveillance did not observe Long come to the 
home, they observed him leave the home and return to the home consistent with the fact that he 
resided at the home. Id.; Tr Vol. I, p. 14, L. 14-19. This bolsters the statement of the tipster that 
Long "currently lived in the residence [and] had been there for approximately one year." Tr Vol. 
I, p. 7, L. 9-11. This also flies in the face of the State's claim that, "[c]ontrary to Long's 
assertion, these observations are entirely consistent with Detective Cagle's observations and his 
knowledge of the common residency status of individuals involved in indoor grow operations." 
Brief of Respondent, p. 12, L. 15-17. 
The anonymous tipster allegedly stated that "[t]hey hardly ever see this person. The only 
time they're outside is to mow the lawn. They never park a car there. They never see anybody 
outside of the house." Tr Vol. I, p. 7, L. 11-13. The anonymous tipster, however, also stated 
that, "they saw the fans 1 in the back yard in the door of the screen in the back." Tr Vol. I, p. 7, 
L. 15-16. The tipster also points to a bright light2 coming out of "[o]ne of the windows in ... the 
back of the residence." Tr Vol. I, p. 7, L. 19-20. These facts strongly suggest the tipster lived in 
a home positioned so as to have a view only of the back of 11576 Crested Butte (hereinafter, 
"11576"). This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Detective Cagle gained access to and 
testified to a view and description of the back yard at 11576. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 7 - p.9, L. 3. 
1 Note that the tipster identified the fans as simply "fans." It is only the conclusory opinion of the officer that 
throughout the testimony they are labeled as "exhaust fans." 
2 Note that the tipster claims there was a bright light coming out of 11576 Crested Butte, not a grow light. 
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The conclusion that the tipster lived behind Long is significant because it greatly 
diminishes the significance of his/her observations. A person residing behind Long would be 
less likely to see Long in any other area of the home except for the back of the home, explaining 
why he is only seen when mowing his yard. A person residing behind Long would also be less 
likely to see a vehicle parked there as most homes, including Long's, are constmcted with front-
facing garages and additional parking available along the street in the.front of the residence. All 
in all, the tipster's information and the officer's observations did not support a conclusion that 
Long did not reside at 11576, but to the contrary, confirmed that he did reside there and had 
resided there for approximately one (1) year. 
The State correctly contends that "the magistrate was not required to interpret the 
evidence presented in the light most favorable to Long." Brief of Respondent, p. 13, L. 1-3. 
However, the magistrate is required to ensure that "his action [not] be a mere ratification of the 
bare conclusions of others" and is to make "[the usual inferences which reasonable men draw 
from evidence] [as] a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 239-40, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332-33 (1983) (citation omitted). Additionally, reviewing courts 
must "ensure that... an abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur [ and] ... continue to 
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued" in order to 
maintain the protection provided by the wording and jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 239. 
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The proposition that the evidence was consistent with ISP Cagle's training that people 
don't reside where they grow marijuana fails when properly assessed using the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw. All in all, the evidence offered was inconsistent with ISP Cagle' s 
training and experience and does not independently amount to a substantial basis upon which a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment protections can be justified. 
II. THE FACTS VIEWED UNDER THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST DO 
NOT JUSTIFY THE CHIEF EVIL AGAINST WHICH THE WORDING OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT IS DIRECTED. 
The State attacks Long's analysis of the facts presented as a '"divide-and-conquer' 
approach ... contrary to the totality of circumstances test applicable to search warrants." Brief of 
Respondent, p. 14, L. 16-18 ( citation omitted). The State points to several cases in order to 
support this argument, but each of them is significantly distinguishable. In each of State v. 
Brumfield, State v. Grantham, and United States v. Arvizu, the reviewing court is tasked with 
examining what might be viewed individually as innocent facts under the totality of 
circumstances test but only to reach a reasonable suspicion in order to justify an investigatory 
stop or expansion of the scope of a traffic stop of a vehicle where there is a well established 
diminished expectation of privacy. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 42 P.3d 706 (Ct.App. 
2001); State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128 (Ct.App. 2008); United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, (2002). A reasonable suspicion standard, however, does "not rise 
to the level required for probable cause." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751 (citation 
omitted). Furthermore, in both Brumfield and Grantham, probable cause to search each vehicle 
was not established until a drug dog alerted on the vehicles. Brumfield, 136 Idaho at 915, 42 
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P.3d at 708; Grantham, 146 Idaho at 494, 198 P.3d at 132. This is sharply contrasted with 
Long's case where probable cause is required in order to justify the "physical entry of the home 
[which] is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." State 
v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466,469, 197 P.3d 327,330 (Ct.App. 2008) (citation omitted). In 
Long's case, there was not so much as a trained dog that pointed to the home and alleged the 
presence of marijuana. 
The State also cited State v. Alexander. Brief of Respondent, p. 13, L. 21; p. 15, L. 2-15. 
At least in that case a search warrant was the subject of the court's review. There, however, the 
search warrant was acquired on the basis of testimony of a caller who wished to remain 
anonymous who claimed the property in question had an active methamphetamine lab where he 
had personally purchased methamphetamine multiple times and gave a detailed description of the 
property, the location of the lab, and identified with specificity the names, genders, and ages of 
seven (7) people living on or associated with the property including five (5) children. State v. 
Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 23, 56 P.3d 780,785 (Ct.App. 2002). Additionally, a neighbor 
reported "constant traffic making short stops at the residence at all hours of the day and night for 
the past year and a half' as well as smelling ·'a chemical odor coming from the Alexander 
property." Id. at 24. Innocent facts combined with evidence of that quality rise to the level of 
probable cause. In this case, at the risk of being repetitive, nobody alleged Long was growing 
marijuana, nobody claimed to have smelled marijuana or to have even seen marijuana, and 
nobody reported any suspicious traffic at the residence. There simply was no evidence of 
marijuana. The magistrate acted on the bare conclusory opinion of an officer engaged in the 
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competitive world of law enforcement. 
It is the province of the courts to decipher the probative value and quality of facts versus 
the mere quantity of facts offered to support the acquisition of a search warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. ISP Cagle could have continued to inundate the magistrate 
with innocent facts alleged to be consistent with his training and experience which ultimately 
would have added no value in terms of quality of evidence. For instance, had Long been 
wearing dark sunglasses during the single surveillance executed, ISP Cagle could have offered to 
the court that it is consistent with his training and experience that marijuana users and growers 
wear dark sunglasses due to the sensitivity to light experienced while under the influence of 
marijuana. Long also owns a vehicle. This fact could be offered as being consistent with ISP 
Cagle's training and experience that marijuana growers generally own vehicles because they are 
necessary for the acquisition and implementation of garden materials utilized in grow operations. 
There is simply no shortage of innocuous facts that can be offered into evidence in support of a 
search warrant if the officer need only tout consistency with his training and experience. The 
real question is whether those facts are qualitatively enough to trump the sanctity and bedrock 
principle that in America people are free from unreasonable searches of their homes. 
In this case, the pertinent facts are simple. A renter has resided in a house for a year 
where he keeps a well-kept green lawn, has two (2) fans mounted in a sliding glass door in the 
back of the house, employs bright lights in his home, and covers one window in the front of his 
house with a non-transparent material. He has been convicted of three marijuana-type crimes 
some time in his past in Illinois, he drives a pickup with an MDT computer in it, and he has been 
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observed lookinR at gardening supplies and fe11ilizer in July even though he has no gardening 
space in the back yard. Additionally, a back yard neighbor only sees him when he is mowing his 
lawn. Those facts, viewed as a whole under the totality of circumstances test do not justify the 
··physical entry of the home [which] is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.'' State v. Reynolds. 146 Idaho 466. 469, 197 P.3d 327, 330 (Ct.App. 
2008) ( citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant hereby respectfully requests this Court reverse the decision of the District 
Court and suppress all evidence that followed the violation of the Fourth Amendment and 
Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article I, § l 7. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of July, 2011. 
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JACQUES LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
JACQUES LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
2021 Cleveland Blvd. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 344-2224 
Facsimile: (208) 287-4300 
E-mail: attomey.michael@yahoo.com 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of July, 201 LI served two (2) true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Appellant '.s· Reply Brief upon the following as named below and 
in the manner checked: 
Lav.Tence G. Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise. Idaho 83720-0010 
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